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Pilzkrieg: The German Wartime Quest for Penicillin. 
 
Gilbert Shama 
 
The last 15 years or so have seen the appearance of a number of articles and 
biographies that have attempted to dispel many of the myths surrounding the 
discovery of penicillin and its development as a useful antibiotic. The story of this 
remarkable compound is invariably presented as a triumph of Anglo-American 
collaboration at a time of need.   However, attempts to produce penicillin during the 
Second World War were not confined to Britain and the USA.  Parallel efforts were 
also taking place in Germany.  It is, however, only in the last 10 years that historians 
have turned their attention to this particular twist in the story of penicillin. The fact 
that their story is not more widely known about is because the events have only been 
recounted by German historians writing in their own language. Yet, paradoxically, the 
first accounts of German attempts to manufacture penicillin were written in English in 
intelligence reports which were compiled immediately after the defeat of Germany in 
May 1945. The reports were prepared under the auspices if the British Intelligence 
Objectives Subcommittee (BIOS) and the Combined Intelligence Objectives 
Subcommittee (CIOS). They were originally given security classifications, but those 
reports dealing with purely industrial or commercial information were rapidly 
declassified and were published by the HMSO from 1946 until well into the 1950s.  
This account draws both on the BIOS and CIOS reports as well as on more recent 
German studies in order to present a portrait of the research carried out and its 
principal participants.   
 
The Shadow of Germany 
 
Towards the end of 1939 Howard Florey and Ernst Chain at the Sir William Dunn 
School of Pathology at Oxford secured a grant to study antibacterial substances.  They 
chanced to start with penicillin and by the summer of 1940 had succeeded in isolating 
it and in showing that it possessed powerful antibacterial action in vivo. They 
published their work in the medical journal The Lancet. Also in that summer, Florey 
and a few trusted colleagues succumbed to a fear of imminent German invasion that 
was sweeping the nation and transferred spores of Penicillium notatum onto the 
linings of their jackets: should the invasion occur, at least one of them might succeed 
in escaping to the USA with the precious mould.  
 
A threat of a more concrete kind reached Florey in April 1941.  German scientists, he 
learned, were keen to examine penicillin and would attempt to acquire some through 
the Swiss pharmaceutical company Ciba Geigy.  Florey acted swiftly and wrote to 
Alexander Fleming as well as R. St. John Brook, the head of National Collection of 
Type Cultures, warning of the consequences of P. notatum falling into German hands.  
He also wrote to Sir Edward Mellanby, chairman of the Medical Research Council 
which had partly been funding the work on penicillin.  In his reply, Mellanby assured 
him that he was ‘miles ahead’ of any competition and that there was no point in 
suppressing publication on penicillin in the national interest because effective anti-
bacterials - information on the sulphonamides - were so widely available.  Florey took 
the hint and in August 1941 a second paper, this time containing a wealth of technical 
information, appeared in The Lancet.  Included were details of the growth medium for 
culturing P. notatum, a method of assaying penicillin and illustrations of the spouted 
ceramic culture vessels used to grow the mould as well as the apparatus for harvesting 
the penicillin-containing broth.  Most importantly, the article revealed the procedure 
for extracting penicillin from crude fermentation broths.  It was this crucial step that 
had defeated not only Fleming, but later also Harold Raistrick at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Roger Reid in the USA. In short, the paper 
provided all the information required to set up a penicillin manufacturing process – 
assuming, that is, that one possessed Fleming’s strain of P.  notatum. 
 
Research and development of penicillin 
 
Evidence from a number of sources indicates that both of The Lancet papers reached 
Germany, via neutral Sweden.  Its initial distribution on arrival in Germany was not 
determined purely on technical grounds. There was a pecking order with those having 
high Nazi Party connections being at the top of the list.  One who had early access to 
it was Theodore Morell, Hitler’s personal physician.  Morell was not highly regarded 
in German medical circles and after the war Albert Speer described him as a 
‘screwball interested only in money’.  The involvement of such disreputable 
individuals probably added to the delays in the Lancet articles reaching those who 
could make proper use of them. The consensus of opinion is that penicillin research 
began in Germany sometime in late 1942. Therefore the Lancet papers would 
probably have had to reach bona fide scientists in the late summer of 1942 – fully two 
years after the appearance of the first paper.   
 
News of penicillin spread quickly throughout the German pharmaceutical community.  
Companies of all sizes as well as universities and research institutes became involved 
in a scramble to produce the antibiotic.  Prominent among the former were most of the 
divisions of IG Farbenindustrie – Hoechst, Elberfeld, Marburg, and also E. Merck of 
Darmstadt, Schering AG of Berlin, Schott and Genossen of Jena and Knöll of 
Ludwigshafen. 
 
The first stumbling block facing these would-be producers was that of obtaining a 
penicillin-producing strain of Penicillium.  On receipt of his warning about the 
undesirability of Germany acquiring penicillin, Fleming assured Florey that, whilst he 
had sent out many samples of his culture of P. notatum all over the world, none as far 
as he could remember had gone to Germany.  His memory was at fault; a certain Dr 
Schmidt at the IG Marburg Works had received a culture from Fleming some years 
before the war.  Schmidt had never attempted to do anything with the strain but with a 
revival of interest in penicillin, he attempted to grow it.  He failed, and perhaps 
doubting his mycological technique, he then sent the culture to Schering in Berlin but 
they too were unsuccessful.   This was not the last word on this celebrated strain as far 
as Germany was concerned. There were at least two further attempts to acquire it. 
There were suspicions in Germany that both the Pasteur Institute and the University 
of Copenhagen possessed Fleming’s mould.  In fact Fleming had personally given 
Andre Lwoff of the Pasteur Institute a culture.  However it is doubtful if a culture 
existed in Copenhagen but Professor K. A. Jensen had heard about penicillin and had 
succeeded in isolating his own strains.  In any event, the Germans did not succeed in 
obtaining Fleming’s strain.  
 
With the fall of Holland, Germany had at its disposal, what Florey described in a 
letter as ‘the best (mould) culture collection in the world.’  This was the Centraal 
Bureau voor Schimmelcultures (CBS) located at Baarn, near Utrecht. German 
microbiologists were not slow to arrive at this realisation.  Fleming had never 
deposited his culture with the CBS but their culture catalogue showed that they held a 
closely related strain, Penicillium notatum (Westling). The archives at Baarn contain 
scores of requests for this from the companies listed above as well as from other 
smaller firms and universities in Germany.  The strain had been deposited at Baarn 
many years before and would have been sub-cultured many times without regard to its 
antibiotic productivity – indeed in total ignorance that it even possessed such a trait. It 
was at best only a poor penicillin producer.  There is no evidence that it ever featured 
prominently in German penicillin research. Interestingly, a paper published in Nature 
in November1942 characterised the strain as a producer of notatin.  
 
It was not long before German microbiologists set about isolating their own strains. 
Some microbiologists worked independently whilst others appear to have shared their 
strains with colleagues from other laboratories.  Notable among the latter was 
Andreas Lembke.  Lembke was the Director of a Research Institute in Kiel that was 
concerned primarily with milk technology.  Lembke had mycological experience and 
had assembled at Kiel a fairly extensive collection of moulds.  The entire collection 
was destroyed in bombing late towards the end of the war.  In 1943, together with 
Joseph VonKennel and Joseph Kimmig, he wrote what is possibly the only article on 
antibiotics published in Germany during the War.  This work described the isolation 
of moulds belonging to a number of genera including Penicillium, Aspergillus, 
Fusarium and Cephalosporium, all of which allegedly produced anti-bacterial 
substances.  Lembke and his co-workers named these substances ‘mykoins.’ Kimmig, 
who had previously worked on novel sulphonamides, came to devote much effort to 
penicillin research and was supported in this by Schering AG.   Hans Knöll, a 
microbiologist employed by the glass company Schott and Genossen, also provided 
strains to many other researchers. Elsewhere, at IG Elberfeld, Maria Brommelhues, 
working in Gerhard Domagk’s (the pioneer of sulphonamides) laboratory had isolated 
some 50 strains of penicillia.  She was aware that not all of the antibiotics produced 
by these strains were penicillin and she was able to separate the penicillin producers 
in her collection from those that produced other secondary metabolites such as 
notatin, and patulin.   
 
The practices and procedures described in the second of Florey’s Lancet papers seem 
to have been widely adopted by most workers in Germany.  In particular, penicillin 
was being assayed by variants of the bioassay originally developed in Oxford by 
Norman Heatley.   After 1942 publication of process details in Britain and the United 
States on penicillin production were subject to fairly strict controls.  However, these 
controls were not total and useful information did occasionally get out into the public 
domain. More than one group of workers in Germany seem to have been aware that 
corn steep liquor (CSL) had a beneficial effect on penicillin yields.  Whether they 
knew quite what it was is a different matter; one contemporary reference mistranslates 
it as ’maisalkohol.’ Most researchers in Germany employed surface culture 
techniques for growing their strains. A variety of vessels were used but Hans Killian 
at the University of Breslau employed rectangular vessels identical to those used in 
Oxford, but made of glass rather than ceramic.  However, it emerges that a significant 
number of research workers had experimented with submerged culture.  Not 
surprisingly they reached the same conclusions as those arrived at by American 
microbiologists at the Northern Regional Research Laboratories in Peoria, Illinois.  
This was that strains isolated on their ability to produce penicillin in surface culture 
are not necessarily able to produce similar yields in submerged culture. How German 
scientists came to know of the potential advantages of submerged culture is not 
certain.  Reports that this method was being used for large scale production did appear 
in American chemical industry trade journals in 1944 and news of this may well have 
reached Germany.  It is certain that many details of the American programme were 
known about as an article published in Chemiker Zeitung, a chemical trade journal 
makes clear.  The article published in October 1944 revealed details of the existence 
of the War Production Board (WPB) and quotes the names of American companies 
involved in penicillin production as well as their production targets.  It is also possible 
that Konrad Bernhauer of the University of Prague was promoting submerged 
fermentation. Bernhauer had written a standard work on fermentation chemistry in 
which the principles of submerged fermentation were laid out.   
 
Whilst most of the technology employed in Germany for penicillin research and 
development was based on Anglo-American developments, German workers did 
conduct at least some original research.  Not all of it was guaranteed to result in 
improved penicillin yields.  When workers at the IG Hoechst works encountered 
persistent contamination, they countered with the use of ‘antibodies’ such as ether and 
chloroform.  More interestingly, some German microbiologists tried using mixtures of 
strains in order to increase penicillin yields.  Others attempted to grow penicillia on 
waste liquors from paper mills. One entrepreneur named Bruno Bottcher had 
developed an electro-osmotic diaphragm technique for purifying penicillin.  Schering 
AG were sufficiently impressed to supply Bottcher with penicillin which was 
conveyed to him from Berlin in vacuum flasks.  Joseph Kimmig had even attempted 
to understand how penicillin acted and although he arrived at an erroneous conclusion 
–that it disrupted the succinic acid cycle in bacteria – his work reveals a serious 
commitment to penicillin research.  Heinz Oeppinger at IG Hoechst interviewed 
immediately after the war by Harold Raistrick, apparently impressed Raistrick with 
his design for a ‘rotating drum device’ for submerged fermentation.  
 
Organic chemists in Germany must have asked themselves, just as their counterparts 
in Britain and the USA did, whether they might not be able to synthesise penicillin 
chemically.  The only information available to the former was a formula for penicillin 
published in Nature by Heilbron and his co-workers in 1942.  Heilbron’s formula was 
subsequently shown to be incorrect.  However this intelligence, and further 
developments which did lead to the correct formula and eventual synthesis by a 
combined Anglo-American team, were subject to a very strict publication embargo. 
Highly purified material is an absolute requirement for meaningful formula and 
structural studies and this was never available in Germany during the war.   
 One intelligence report accounts how scientists at IG Marburg claimed to have 
‘practically pure penicillin’. The writers of the report describe being shown ‘a small 
piece of moist looking orange coloured, clumpy material’ – their incredulity is almost 
tangible.  Research workers at a small number other laboratories claimed to have 
supplied some or all of their penicillin to chemists for ‘structural studies’.  Hopes of 
elucidating the structure of penicillin and then synthesising it chemically probably 
explain the involvement of the distinguished chemist Richard Kuhn.  Kuhn had been 
nominated for the Nobel Prize in 1938 for his work on the structure of vitamins and 
carotenoids, but forbidden by a decree of Hitler’s from accepting it.  Kuhn had been 
working on synthetic antibacterials, and claimed that one of his compounds ‘3065’ 
(ethanedione, bis(5-bromo-2-hydroxyphenyl) was allegedly ‘300 times’ more potent 
than penicillin.  What is interesting is his source of penicillin.  The German War 
Ministry had in its possession some Allied penicillin which had been captured by the 
German army.  Other than the fact that it was manufactured by Burroughs Wellcome, 
nothing is known of where it was taken or of its date of capture.  One can only 
speculate as to the delay which this penicillin incurred in reaching the various German 
laboratories and the conditions to which it had been subjected to whilst in transit.  It 
seems likely that by the time it reached Kuhn it had lost most of its activity.  Kuhn 
was correct in that 3065 does indeed possess antibacterial power, but his conclusions 
about its efficacy compared to penicillin were certainly wrong.  As Head of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute in Heidelberg, Kuhn was in an influential position and his findings 
must have fuelled German suspicions that the power of penicillin had been 
exaggerated by the Allies for propaganda reasons.   
  
Heatley’s assay technique, widely used in Germany, would have detected any 
antibiotic substance that inhibited the growth of the ‘target bacterium’, 
Staphylococcus aureus.  With penicillia being isolated from a variety of sources by 
several groups of workers, it seems possible that some researchers in Germany may 
not have been working with penicillin but with other secondary metabolites.  Some in 
Germany understood this.  The Canadian microbiologist Roger Y. Stanier was 
charged with preparing a report for BIOS on applied microbiological research in 
Germany and met and interviewed a number of German scientists.  Andreas Lembke 
told him that at least one of the mykoins he had isolated - mykoin C - was chemically 
distinct from penicillin.  Lembke cited the fact that mykoin C’s spectrum of anti-
bacterial activity was distinct from that of penicillin.  As evidence, he told Stanier that 
it was not inactivated by penicillinase.  Kuhn had not been the only scientist to receive 
captured Allied penicillin, and it is quite possible that Lembke was able to reach his 
conclusions because he had access to some ‘authentic’, but low potency, penicillin. 
Stanier’s curt assessment was that mykoin C was probably ‘a mixture of clavacin with 
some penicillin.’  
 
Some penicillin was certainly produced in Germany, although it was never produced 
on a sufficiently large scale as to be of anything remotely approaching strategic value.  
Theodore Morell’s diaries show that penicillin was used by him to treat Adolf Hitler’s 
injured hand following the July 1944 bomb plot.  The penicillin may have been 
produced at Olomutz in Czechoslovakia.  The facility at Olomutz had been seized 
from its original Jewish owners and placed under Theodore Morell’s control.  
Morell’s actual contribution to penicillin work was insignificant but he employed two 
scientists, Kurt Mulli and Wolfgang Laves to supervise work at the plant.  Both of 
these men had Jewish ancestry.  Morell went on to receive the Iron Cross in 1943 for 
the discovery of ‘bacteriostatic substances from the lower fungi.’ Information about 
this came to the attention of the press in Britain and The People ran a story headed 
‘Huns steal new drug.’ References to clinical trials occurs a number of times in the 
BIOS and CIOS reports.  Learning from Lembke that some of the antibiotics he had 
produced were sent to a hospital in Segebeck for clinical trials, Stanier took himself 
there.  He was unimpressed with what he found and although the clinicians at 
Segebeck provided accounts of the penicillin’s efficacy in treated dermatological 
conditions, Stanier concluded that no meaningful clinical trials had been carried out. 
Hoechst claimed to have manufactured a number of penicillin containing products 
including, ‘penicillin wound powder’ and penicillin impregnated bandages, neither of 
which, they hastened to add, were ever supplied to the German armed forces.  In some 
cases researchers appear unwilling to submit their material for such trials believing it 
to be too impure. 
 
 The Ultimate Failure of German Efforts 
 
Why did the German programme not succeed in producing useful quantities of 
penicillin? There are a number of reasons.  Immediately after the war the technical 
intelligence teams touring Germany attributed this failure to an over-reliance on the 
sulphonamides.  Although these were important products for the German 
pharmaceutical industry, this conclusion appears too simplistic now.  Penicillin 
research was taking place in Domagk’s own laboratory under Maria Brommelhues 
and even Joseph Kimmig, who owed his reputation to the sulphonamides, became a 
convert to penicillin. 
 
As the first antibiotic, penicillin was to herald a new era for pharmaceutical 
companies.  Here was a compound which seemed to defy the best efforts of organic 
chemists, a group of professionals that had served the German pharmaceutical well. 
Success in producing penicillin demanded application of established technology – 
fermentation - to the production of an entirely novel compound.  In the United States 
the experience of the fermentation industry was rapidly and efficiently mobilised by 
the WPB to the services of penicillin production.  The main industrial participants in 
German penicillin work were the constituent companies of IG Farben, Schering and 
Merck.  These had all achieved notable success with synthesised compounds and 
would have found the necessary transition difficult to make.  In fact considerable 
fermentation experience existed in Germany.  Germany had been at the forefront of 
fermentation technology from a time dating to before the First World War when a 
substantial proportion of their fodder requirements were met by yeast grown 
specifically for the purpose.   In the inter-war years the fodder yeast industry had 
declined, but in 1939 it again assumed a strategic significance.  Some companies 
conducted their operations in fermentation vessels of 600 m
3
 capacity.  The failure to 
bring together existing fermentation experience and the considerable fermentation 
capacity in Germany proved costly.  
 
Whilst it is clear that useful collaborations between different research workers and 
companies were established, it is also evident that there was also wasteful duplication 
and with a race to produce penicillin, duplication of effort would have been 
damaging. The absence of a central reference laboratory was a definite disadvantage.  
Microbiologists may have been freely exchanging strains but there seems not to have 
been any systematic attempts to identify the most productive ones.  Whilst Heatley’s 
assay was in general use, there appeared to have been no attempts to standardise the 
technique throughout Germany.  At the IG Elberfeld Works, the scientists told their 
Allied interrogators that they were producing penicillin of a potency of 40 Oxford 
units. However, on further questioning they were forced to admit that the potency was 
in reality 40 ‘Elberfeld Units’.   When in July 1941, penicillin process development 
was in effect transferred to the NRRL, Florey took Heatley with him specifically so 
that he could instruct the microbiologists at Peoria on the finer points of his assay.  
 
The scale of the American programme to produce penicillin was estimated to have 
cost about $14 million.  Unfortunately no comparable data exists for the 
uncoordinated German effort.  But it was certainly very considerably less. As 
instance, one recent article refers to Richard Kuhn as having received 25, 000 Reichs 
Marks for ‘research on antibacterial compounds’; this was equivalent to 
approximately $ 10,000.  
 
Both the British and the American wartime programmes owed their success to central 
co-ordination.  German realisation of the need to co-ordinate the disparate activities 
came too late.  Heinz Oeppinger was present at a meeting held under the 
Chairmanship of Professor Paul Rostock in which Konrad Bernhauer was put in 
charge of a co-ordinating committee.   Oeppinger said that ‘by the time of that 
meeting, we could get no yeast, no acids, no supplies or materials.  It was all over.’  
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